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Abstract
This paper reviews the recent argument that forensics is epistemic, suggesting that those who adopt
that metaphor could serve themselves better by approaching impromptu speaking as an epistemic exercise. It draws upon Pat Gehrke's critique of debate
pedagogy to form a framework to analyze impromptu as it is currently performed—and its obsession
with starting from the truth, espousing all views with
certainty, and adhering to a linear model of analysis.
Finally, it offers several options for those impromptuers wishing to break the mold, arguing that the socalled "mistakes" made by beginning impromptuers
could, with practice, lead to more insightful speeches
than the current style of competition.
Introduction
James Geary (2005), author of two books about
aphorisms (or what we call “impromptu quotations”), calls them “particle accelerators for the
mind.” He explains his fascination for the earliest,
and shortest, literary form:
They make you question everything you do.
Aphorisms are spurs to action. It‟s not enough to
just read one and mutter sagely to yourself, „How
true, how true.‟ Aphorisms make you want to do
something; admiring them without putting them
into practice is like learning to read music but
neglecting to play an instrument. (p. 8)
A full-career impromptu speaker will put hundreds of these assertions into practice. The current
expectation in the event requires that the student
select a single interpretation of each quotation, then
argue for or against its accuracy. While teaching an
introductory impromptu speaker this method eases
the difficulty for instructors, more experienced competitors may encounter a malaise toward the event.
Some consider the structure too limiting; it provides
little wiggle room for considering multiple ways a
quotation can be construed. Similarly, the constant
arguing of linear perspectives may eventually feel
like oversimplification. More than a few impromptu
speakers have confessed to me that they felt like a
“motivational speaker” by the end of their career. I
target this paper toward those experiencing this impromptu malaise, and recommend new approaches
to prevent intelligent minds from feeling constricted.

Maximizing the effectiveness of impromptu as a
learning exercise will require competitors to aspire
toward an epistemic perspective.
Robert Littlefield (2006) recently broke
from the ranks of those debating the educational or
competitive nature of forensics. Instead, he claimed
that forensics, like rhetoric, is epistemic. Forensics
provides experiential knowledge, forcing students to
adapt to the complexities of each unique environment, from the preferences of individual judges to
fellow competitors' interpretation of events. Just as
in the real world, the most honest and hard-working
individual may fail. What Littlefield provides is a
personal philosophy for forensics, one which may
not only help the community better understand the
activity, but also help fledgling programs justify their
existence:
In the end, I must be content with an imperfect,
relativistic world where not all is good, not all are
fair, not all are ethical, and not all practices are
justifiable. The only way I can justify forensics is
with the understanding that experience is knowledge; forensics is epistemic. (p. 13)
I believe that Littlefield's insights deserve to be
taken seriously, if only as a coping mechanism for
students who put forth great effort for little reward.
But for those of us who adopt an epistemic metaphor
for forensics, it would serve us well to evaluate the
events as we teach them and consider how to better
harness the metaphor. The experience of forensics is
epistemic. But are our events epistemic?
Pat Gehrke (1998) reviews the theory of rhetoric
as epistemic, as advanced by Robert Scott: The belief
that truth stems from human interaction. Gehrke
argues that we should not approach arguments as
though we possess correct answers. Likewise, he
does not believe we should regard those we debate
against as “opponents,” but rather as possessors of
unique perspectives and ideas to be “constructively
engaged” (p. 9). He confronts current argumentation
pedagogy, highlighting four ways in which textbooks
and professors have failed to connect theories of epistemic rhetoric to actual teaching:
First, argumentation texts favor a particular logical model of reasoning: a Western linear mode
of logic. Second, there is an implicit assumption
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of the need to know the truth before engaging in
argument. Third, these texts approach argumentation and debate from an oppositional model.
Fourth, and perhaps most disturbing, the critical
tools of argumentation are depicted as ways to
assess others' reasoning and rarely one's own.
(p. 5)
In this paper, I apply these criticisms of debate
pedagogy to the practice of impromptu speaking at
American Forensics Association and National Forensics Association tournaments. I select impromptu
because it has inexplicit rules and guidelines. It is
the one event where students are literally provided
seven minutes to grapple with a quotation however
they choose. The expectation that every speech push
a single persuasive argument is, therefore, an entirely “unwritten rule” that students have every right to
break. (This differs from persuasion, where, as the
name implies, the student should persuade.) Further, because impromptu is a limited preparation
event, students who concur with my sentiments can
nimbly react and experiment without sacrificing the
time required to write and memorize scripts. For this
reason, I believe that if forensics competitors truly
seek to dismantle the rigidity of their activity, impromptu could be the most reasonable place to begin. My goal is to place forensicators on the road toward an impromptu ripe with experimentation and
aligned with the epistemic perspective that many
communication scholars have embraced.
Difficulties with Impromptu
Truly epistemic argumentation recognizes a diverse array of argumentative styles, including feminist, non-Western, and narrative-based models. As
Gehrke attests, most argumentation textbooks fail to
address these theoretical shifts. Instead, he states,
they “generally rely upon syllogisms, the Toulmin
model, or fallacies of informal logic” (p. 6). Similarly,
impromptu speaking utilizes a simplified version of
Stephen Toulmin‟s logical model. The Toulmin model stresses the "movement" from observable data,
through warrants for a position, to a claim (Benoit,
Hample, & Benoit, 1992, p. 227).
"Unified analysis," the structure utilized by the
vast majority of impromptu speakers, hinges on
movement from the data given (the quotation) to a
claim (the speaker's thesis statement). The speaker
then provides two warrants, or "reasons" for their
claim. True to the Toulmin model, the speaker illuminates backing for his argument, in the form of
theories or anecdotal examples. Impromptuers are
expected by judging paradigms to repeat every major
argumentative warrant, or "tag," multiple times in
the speech. This technique is called "signposting,"
and ensures that the speech answers a question central to Toulmin's model: "How [did] you get there?"
(Benoit, Hample, & Benoit, p. 227) This allows
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/ndcieproceedings/vol4/iss1/27
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judges to transcribe the speech easily, diagramming
the speaker's utterances in a linear outline. Even
less-used “three-point” structures, though moldbreaking, still emphasize signposts and a linear
structure centering on a thesis statement. Impromptu, therefore, suffers from the same linearity Gehrke
observed in argumentation classrooms—and limits
speakers‟ rhetoric more than a fully observed Toulmin model.
Gehrke‟s second contention with argumentation
pedagogy is its assumption that one must start from
the truth, and argue accordingly (p. 7). Like debate,
impromptu has fallen into the truth-adherence rut.
Impromptu speakers are taught to always agree or
disagree with their quotation. Their thesis statement
is then built on this choice, and the speaker argues
accordingly.
The notion that a student must “pick a side” is
troubling because seldom will the student actually
“know” what he is arguing. When a student develops
his interpretation of the quotation, the reasoning
used is what theorist Charles Peirce (1998) called
“abduction.” The process is as follows:
“The surprising fact, C, is observed.
But if A were true, C would be a matter of
course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true
(p. 231)”
It is, literally, the process of forming a hypothesis. In the case of impromptu, C is the quotation,
which is always a surprise, and A is the immediate
stab at its meaning. As Peirce suggests, “The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of
insight.” But, Peirce warns, the abduction is an “extremely fallible insight (p. 227).”
Abduction is untested and unreasoned. It is,
quite simply, an immediate hypothesis. When an
impromptu speaker develops a “thesis,” what he has
truly developed is a hypothesis: An abductive, potential explanation. Yet, competitors are encouraged to
speak with an air of certainty, jettisoning all doubt.
In other words: Not only does impromptu force students to start from a truth; it forces students to argue on behalf of an untested truth.
Third, Gehrke criticizes the oppositional nature
of argumentation pedagogy. He refers to numerous
other scholars who refute the mindset that a debate
takes place between two rival positions, where only
one can be correct (p. 9, 10). Epistemic perspectives
do not embrace such absolutism, because beliefs rely
on individual experience. A student respecting the
multiplicity of possible beliefs on a subject should be
commended as insightful. As Toulmin (1992) explained in his book Cosmopolis: “Tolerating… plurality, ambiguity, or lack of certainty is no error, let
alone a sin. Honest reflection shows that it is part of
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the price we inevitably pay for being human beings,
and not gods.” (p. 30).
The notion that other sides should be attacked,
rather than thoughtfully contemplated, has also been
adopted in impromptu. Before speaking, impromptuers do not witness each other‟s speeches, which
prevents direct refutation. However, students still
refuse to consider any viewpoint beyond the solitary,
linear argument they construct. Consider a student,
in an impromptu round at a national tournament,
using one of the following claims:
1) “While most of the time, X perspective is true, I
will argue that we should be mindful of Y perspective.”
2) “In my personal experience, Y perspective is correct.”
3) “While my first instinct was to argue Y perspective, I hit a snag and realized X perspective must
be correct.”
In the first example, judges would chastise the
student for conceding that other arguments are more
often true than their own. In the second, one could
expect a judge to trivialize the student‟s use of personal experience as evidence; impromptuers are expected to speak in universals. In the third instance,
the competitor has conceded that their first hypothesis failed, and that they had to restart with a different one. As a student groping for truth, this speaker
has the potential to grapple with the multifaceted
nature of the quotation. However, the student has
acknowledged an alternative viewpoint, and will
likely suffer as a result.
When students feign omnipotence in their arguments, they reject the linear Western model to
which the competitive framework otherwise adheres.
In order to differentiate his model from classical logic, Toulmin included qualifiers that specify degrees
of certainty. He also implemented rebuttal statements, which offer possible circumstances in which a
claim could fall through (Benoit, Hample, & Benoit,
p. 232). In suggesting these as possibilities in structured (or unstructured) argumentation, Toulmin
reinforced the view that faux-confidence need not
infiltrate debates. However, these statements are not
tolerated in impromptu rounds. Instead, forensics
educators teach students that any argument supported by three or four interesting examples can be
advocated with complete certainty.
Finally, Gehrke fears that the three previous
concerns leave students in argumentation classrooms without the capacity for self-reflection. He
finds that textbooks focus on deconstructing what
others say, rather than one‟s own arguments. Students, rather than examining their own identity, instead are taught to combat the “influences” of others
(p. 11). Gehrke stresses the risk this creates: “Focusing argumentation and critical thought away from
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the self impedes the consideration of how arguments
represent and construct the self” (p. 12).
Impromptu provides students with a remarkable
opportunity to identify their own beliefs. Many competitors spend their entire college careers examining
assertion after assertion, contemplating what each
means to them. They call upon their knowledge base
to determine how they will respond to the quotation.
Then, they spend as long as six minutes considering
the subject, actively, in front of an audience of other
critical thinkers. After four years of this, students
should walk away with not only the capacity for producing eloquent sophisms, but also the humility to
recognize how many different ways a simple pithy
statement can be understood. Impromptu, in other
words, could be a powerful tool in identity construction.
Obviously, teaching students to say everything
with complete confidence, and quickly, has practical
benefits. Williams, Carver, and Hart (1993) stressed
impromptu's ability to help students “move intelligently from the classroom to society,” providing
them with the sort of “practical experience” they will
need in job interviews (p. 29, 30). But Gehrke contends that argumentation instructors should resist
the urge for this business-minded pragmatism:
As teachers of argumentation we need to be
careful to avoid the temptation to "sell" our discipline as a "product" that will enhance organizational "output" or personal career "performance." These industry terms subvert the existential motivation to self-critique and return argumentation to the role of a tool for domination
or suppression of others. (p. 39)
As impromptu instructors, we have the fortune
of teaching students willing to place their hearts and
minds on the line in front of an audience. We should
seize this opportunity to create generations of critical
thinkers who do not succumb to the buzz-word mentality that simplifies all ideas into easily transcribed
“tags.” It is time to move toward an impromptu that
is open-minded, situational, and tailored to each
individual competitor‟s experience.
A Toolbox for an Epistemic Impromptu
I have identified how impromptu is restrictive and fails to meet its full potential as an inspiration for self-critique. What I provide is not a rigid
alternative structure, because, like Gerhke, I believe
that a prescriptive antidote “would betray the very
goal of this project” (p. 32). Instead, I advocate several possible alternatives and encourage competitors
to develop and construct their own. Many of these
propositions refine the so-called “mistakes” speakers
make when they begin their careers. Here I suggest
that a speaker who actually practices and develops
what we currently regard as off-limits could even-
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tually deliver deeply insightful and inspiring speeches.
Embrace a Narrative Structure
Impromptu speaking already relies upon anecdotal evidence; most speeches are driven predominantly by stories. As such, converting to a narrativedriven structure would not be a challenging stretch
for most students. Rather than adhering to a rigid,
signposted format of data, warrants, and a claim,
this would be based instead upon the format that
drives many of the most famous speeches in history.
R. H. Stephenson (1980), in his search for an ideal
method for analyzing quotations, drew upon a type
of rhetoric typically ignored by forensics as an activity: Epideictic. As he explains, "this form of oratory...
was assimilated by the ancients to the genre of literary prose and the literary statement of general
truths" (p. 13). Because the aphorisms students analyze lack specific content, the student cycles through
a series of stories that illuminate the multiple issues
it raises.
Gerard Hauser (1999), in his examination of epideictic in Athens, suggested that the teacherpersuader in this type of speech "presents the story
of individuals and deeds worth imitating," interpreting values to the audience along the way (p. 17). The
epideictic impromptu speaker would work from one
narrative episode to the next. The challenge would
lie in creating smooth and eloquent transitions between each story, such that the audience witnesses
the speech as a concrete whole rather than a choppy
series of assertions.
Don’t reveal the Destination
Gehrke notes that many Chinese speakers who
develop English as a second language do not state
their argumentative thesis until the end of an oration
(p. 24). Impromptu competitors should not be criticized for opting to save their central theme until
their conclusion, as this would allow for a speech
that builds to a point of culmination—rather than a
speech that continually tries to justify itself.
Alternately, students could be encouraged to
create a speech that refutes itself—a speech that, in
the spirit of epistemic rhetoric, considers multiple
sides before settling on a position. Adopting this
style would better reflect the way people actually
communicate; as Gehrke notes, traditional Western
structures “can never completely account for the logics of discourse, the multiplicity of ways involved in
the arguments of the everyday” (p. 23). He suggests
that students in debate switch sides mid-argument
to understand the fallibility of each perspective. Impromptuers, who are not tethered to a single position, could go a step further than their forensic peers
in debate. Epistemic speakers would weigh several
perspectives on a quotation before settling on one—
or better yet, settling on none. The self-refuting imhttps://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/ndcieproceedings/vol4/iss1/27
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promptuer could become a manifestation of multifaceted argument. For a speaker to state one case and
in the same breath state another does not merit condemnation. If considered thoughtfully, it could show
that the student appreciates our world‟s uncertain
and untidy nature. By adopting these strategies, students could abandon the imaginary certainty that
currently leaves a “motivational speaker” aftertaste.
Consider the Type of Quotation
Marjorie Garber‟s (1999) assessment of how
writers utilize quotations noted that, “Quotations are
inserted into a borrower-text as precisely what their
authors did not claim: a ground of fact” (p. 666).
Similarly, impromptu speeches almost universally
regard the quotation as a truth-statement; a great
deal of emphasis is placed on interpretation, or what
the point the author “intended to make.” This fails to
recognize that not all quotations are meant to be
taken as statements of truth. By considering the different styles quotations can adopt, speakers can
adapt their speeches to reflect each situation.
Literary theorist Gary Saul Morson (2003) has
created a schema for analyzing quotations, noting
that they tend to adopt one of two major forms: The
dictum and the aphorism. Dicta, he notes, are statements that attempt to close off a philosophical debate; they are declarations that “aspire to absolute
clarity” (p. 417). Aphorisms, on the other hand, are
not meant to be taken as something to be agreed or
disagreed with. They are open-ended philosophical
statements, designed to provoke deeper thought on
an issue (p. 421).
Fellow theorist Kevin Morell (2006) noted
another scale by which aphorisms can be critiqued:
Creative versus destructive. Creative aphorisms have
an optimistic nature and encourage constructive
thinking; destructive aphorisms aim to shut down a
line of thought (p. 373). Grappling with these questions of form before diving into analysis could provide students with new angles and perspectives for
considering the quotation.
Likewise, a specific consideration could be made
for proverbs: What Geary calls an aphorism without
identity (p. 14). Impromptuers frequently receive
proverbs, which are so socially pervasive that students can likely remember hearing them before the
round. In this situation, the student could engage in
an actual rhetorical criticism: They could question
why, exactly, this statement has become so popular
(or so cliché), and whether that reflects positively or
negatively.
Finally, students can, when it applies, recognize
an author‟s context. Certainly, “Absolute power corrupts absolutely” can receive the standard treatment
of interpretation, agreement, and application. But a
competitor who acknowledges the time period or
experiences of Lord Acton can provide background
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and perspective on why he made this utterance, unearthing ironies and inaccuracies in the process.
Ask, “What Does This Quotation Mean to
Me?”
One of the worst taboos in impromptu
speaking is the personal example: the explanation of
how a friend, family member, or speaker dealt with
the situation in the quotation. I suggest that forensicators reevaluate the absolute rejection of a personal
dynamic in the event. In other events, such as AfterDinner Speaking, competitors often receive accolades for delivering speeches that relate to their personal life or plight. In impromptu, permitting students to express what the quotation, or their analysis, means to them would help to eliminate any disconnect between speakers and their speeches.
People have unique and personal reasons for
their beliefs. Near the end of a speech, a disclosure of
biases or personal experiences would shed light on
why the student argued the way he or she did. Not
only would this disclosure give the audience insight
into that student‟s social reality; it would aid the
student in discovering an identity. Perhaps the student could concede that certain arguments were hasty and not in line with more deeply considered beliefs—helping students, with practice, to link their
speeches more closely to their actual worldview.
Build Your Own Structure
I concede that many of the aforementioned ideas
will fall into some type of framework. Some semblance of signposting will be necessary, alongside
theoretical and anecdotal examples to ensure that
judges do not perceive students as merely rambling.
Likewise, the event‟s limited preparation time virtually forces students to have a mental plan for guiding the process of invention. But structures need not
be cookie-cutter. Forensics educators can present a
smorgasbord of argumentative styles and help students create “Frankenstructures” of their own.
Every student sees the world differently; every
student brings a different outlook to the table and
has the potential to create a structure that reflects
his or her unique perspective. While some will contend that unified analysis and similar structures
should remain the universal standard, the belief that
they serve each student equally is unfair. Many students are too contained by the structure, or do not
think in Western chains of logic. To hold those students to unwritten rules is irresponsible. Similarly,
arguing that educators should adhere to these structures simply because they are easier to teach underestimates students‟ abilities, particularly those who
have already developed the skills unified analysis has
to offer. As educators and judges we must help students invent the structures that suit them the best,
and never condemn them for attempting something
out of the ordinary. Breaking speech paradigms re-
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quires extraordinary courage for students. Those
who experiment deserve open-minded ballots so
they are not dissuaded from future attempts.
A caveat: Even upon hearing suggestions for alternative structures, many students will still feel that
unified analysis remains their best fit. I do not intend to condemn students who, upon reflection,
make that decision. However, I still contend that
within that structure‟s confines, students should
strive to acknowledge opposing ideas and express
genuine uncertainty—because any hypothesis generated in a minute has not received the reflection required to justify forthright conviction.
Throwing Away the Ladder
In his first major work, The Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus, philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein
(2003) commented on his aphoristic methodology:
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used
them—as steps—to climb beyond them. (He
must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he
has climbed up it.) (TLP 6.54)
Impromptu speaking can serve a similar role:
Every quotation a speaker receives can act as a rung
on a ladder toward greater understanding. Students
can grasp how much knowledge depends upon circumstances and how each individual‟s story influences what he believes to be true. Just as how Littlefield argued forensics can be justified on the “philosophical level” (p. 1), so too can impromptu.
As entrants in one of the largest events in forensics, an event that is in no way immunized against
judging subjectivity and poorly chosen quotations,
impromptu speakers with a strictly competitive
perspective have set themselves up for disappointment. Speakers who view their event as a philosophical journey will instead perceive their successes and
failures as a bittersweet aspect of the conversation
they chose to join. Our duty, as educators, is to let
these experimenters thrive.
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